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Abstract: 
Securing one’s data and protecting important information from various security threats are essential tasks for all end 
users, whether they be home users or organizational users. The motivation for doing so, however, may be entirely 
different for these two user populations. In 2017, Menard et al. conducted a study of home end users’ behavioral 
intentions regarding the installation of password management software using Self-Determination Theory (SDT), 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), and an integrated SDT-PMT model. This methodological replication study 
replicated those model comparisons to test organizational users’ behavioral intentions. We surveyed more than 300 
organizational users who did not have password management software installed on their devices. We found support to 
suggest that, while both home and organizational users are significantly motivated by PMT- and SDT-enabled appeals, 
organizational users are significantly more motivated than their home user counterparts to install password management 
software when exposed to SDT-embedded appeals. We believe this outcome is the result of the multi-faceted sense of 
accountability (to themselves, their coworkers, and their organization) that organizational users experience but home 
users do not. This methodological replication of Menard et al. (2017) provided an opportunity to expose this multi-
faceted view of accountability among organizational users and offers a foundation for future research to delve more 
closely into the nature of accountability in this context. 
Keywords: Information Security, Protection Motivation Theory, Security model comparison, Self-Determination Theory, 
User security behaviors, Organizational users 
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1 Introduction 
End users, regardless of whether they are organizational users or home users, must protect their information 
from various forms of security threats. In the past, Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) has been adapted 
to the information security (InfoSec) context to better understand what drives end users to engage in such 
protective behaviors. Fear-appeal manipulations, as the core of PMT, were used to produce fear and to 
inspire users’ motivations to protect information security (Boss et al. 2015; Johnston et al. 2015). However, 
there is no motivation-related construct in the PMT-related studies in InfoSec. This suggests that prior 
studies have failed to account for all the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that trigger protective response 
behaviors (Menard et al. 2015). In response to this limitation of PMT, Menard et al. (2017) integrated Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) with PMT to examine how motivation and its three antecedents of autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness explain and predict the protective security behaviors of home end users 
(henceforth referred to as home users). The results of their study indicate that, compared to a fear appeal 
(i.e., a PMT-embedded appeal), a self-determined appeal (i.e., a SDT-embedded appeal) tends to boost a 
more internalized motivation in home users to protect their information and digital assets. Their study was 
the first to directly compare the impact of SDT-embedded appeals and PMT-embedded fear appeals on 
home users’ motivations and behavioral intentions to install password management software.  
An important possible boundary condition of the integrated model developed by Menard et al. (2017) is its 
focus on home users. Organizational users are just as important to our understanding of protection 
motivation, perhaps even more so because of their role in helping organizations lose about $8.76 million 
annually (Ponemon Report 2018). Organizational users are employees of organizations who engage with 
both personal and organizational information technology and data in their daily work and have some 
responsibility for the protection of those assets. They are fundamentally required to participate in security 
practices, yet the exact nature of their participation is, for the most part, volitional (Johnston et al. 2019). To 
further complicate matters, many organizational users are allowed to use their personal devices at work and 
will often transmit and store organizational data on these devices. However, the extent to which they engage 
in recommended security protection behaviors such as advanced password schemas, data encryption, or 
password management tool usage to protect organizational assets accessed or stored in these personal 
devices is dependent upon their own discretion (Crossler et al. 2014; Menard et al. 2017).  
Unlike home users, who are driven solely by personal reasons and manage their own implications for non-
secure behavior, organizational users are accountable to others and to their employer. Yet this diversity of 
accountability should not be assumed to imply a sense of responsibility for the protection of organizational 
assets. Recent research has shown that organizational employees do not see organizational assets in the 
same light as they do personal assets when it comes to motivations to protect them (Johnston et al. 2015). 
Even when using their own devices at work, it is not clear that organizational users are motivated to protect 
the organizational data on them in the same way they are motivated to protect their personal data.  
This variance in motivation is a critical distinction between organizational and home users, and, while 
Menard et al. (2017) claim their “self-determined appeal and integrated SDT-PMT model is applicable to 
organizational settings,” (Menard et al. 2017, p. 1225), we believe that claim may not stand up well to 
scrutiny. Although both SDT and PMT are individual-level theories that can explain behavioral changes, 
home users and organizational users might react differently to the same security appeal. Home users, 
accountable solely to themselves, are likely to be highly motivated to protect their personal information, but 
it is still not clear that the sense of motivation applies similarly to organizational users asked to protect 
organizational assets. For these reasons, we believe a methodological replication of the study conducted 
by Menard et al. (2017) is warranted. In the current study, we adopted the same methods as the original 
study, but focused on organizational users. We examined organizational users’ intentions to voluntarily 
install password management software using a PMT-only model, an SDT-only model, and an integrated 
SDT-PMT model. 
  
AIS Transactions on Replication Research 3 
  
 
Volume 6  Paper 10 
 
2 Theoretical Background and Associated Hypotheses 
The hypotheses tested in the current study are the same as those tested in the original study (see Figure 
1), but the target population is the organizational user. Table 1 contains the hypotheses for the current 
replication study.  
Table 1. Hypotheses for the Replication Study 
Hypothesis 1 Perceived relatedness will positively influence perceptions of threat severity. 
Hypothesis 2 Perceived relatedness will positively influence perceptions of threat 
susceptibility. 
Hypothesis 3 Perceived competence will positively influence perceptions of self-efficacy. 
Hypothesis 4 Perceived autonomy will positively influence perceptions of response efficacy. 
Hypothesis 5 Perceived autonomy will negatively influence perceptions of response cost.  
Hypothesis 6a Perceived relatedness will positively influence motivation toward performing 
the recommended response. 
Hypothesis 6b Perceived competence will positively influence motivation toward performing 
the recommended response. 
Hypothesis 6c Perceived autonomy will positively influence motivation toward performing the 
recommended response. 
Hypothesis 7a Perceived threat severity will positively influence behavioral intention to 
perform secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7b Perceived threat susceptibility will positively influence behavioral intention to 
perform secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7c Perceived self-efficacy will positively influence behavioral intention to perform 
secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7d Perceived response efficacy will positively influence behavioral intention to 
perform secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7e Perceived response cost will negatively influence behavioral intention to 
perform secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7f Motivation toward performing the recommended response will positively 
influence behavioral intention to perform secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7g Perceived relatedness will positively influence behavioral intention to perform 
secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7h Perceived competence will positively influence behavioral intention to perform 
secure behaviors. 
Hypothesis 7i Perceived autonomy will positively influence behavioral intention to perform 
secure behaviors. 
 
The hypothesized model is as follows: 
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                                             Figure 1. Integrated Model of SDT and PMT from the Original Study 
3 Method 
Being that we conducted a methodological replication, we used the same research design as Menard et al. 
(2017); however, we conducted the replication study with organizational users rather than home users. 
Consistent with Menard et al. (2017) and in order to detect and differentiate the effectiveness of SDT- and 
PMT-embedded appeals, we conducted a full factorial experimental design whereby each participant was 
presented with either an SDT-only or a PMT-only appeal. Each appeal was designed to trigger the 
participant’s perceptions of the independent variables from the SDT or the PMT models. The integrated 
model contains variables from both the SDT models and the PMT model and articulates the relationships 
that autonomy, competence, and relatedness from the SDT model have with the PMT variables. We used 
the integrated model to examine whether variances in the PMT variables can be explained by the SDT 
variables. 
3.1 Sampling Frame 
Similar to Menard et al. (2017), we designed the survey using Qualtrics and recruited organizational user 
participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Mechanical Turk has been previously validated as a way 
to recruit reliable participants in much academic research. As the original study has stated, U.S. participants 
on Mechanical Turk are more reliable than participants from other countries. Therefore, we also used only 
U.S. participants in the replication study and included attention check questions in the measurements to 
ensure the participants were answering the measurement items attentively. Further, because our desired 
sample was organizational users of electronic devices, we also restricted participation to MTurk workers 
who self-selected as people who used their devices for organizational purposes. Anonymity in the MTurk 
platform makes it difficult to verify an MTurk worker’s employment status (Jia, Steelman, and Reich 2017), 
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but by following the MTurk data collection recommendations provided by Jia et al. (2017), (e.g. asking for a 
verifiable work email address, keeping the compensation for participation moderate ($1.5), and restricting 
participation to a single opportunity), we were able to increase the validity of the self-reported organizational 
user status of our sample. Table 2 contains the basic demographic information of the participants.   
Table 2. Summary of Demographic Characteristics 
  Percentage (%) 
Gender   
Male 56.23 
Female 43.13 
Unreported 0.01 
Ethnicity   
White, non-Hispanic 58 
Hispanic 21.4 
African American 11 
Asian 6.7 
Native American 0.6 
Pacific Islander 0.2 
Others  1.9 
Unreported  0.4 
Age   
25-34 40.5 
35-44 29.7 
45-54 13.2 
55-64 9.3 
Over 65 1.7 
Employee Status   
Full-time 80.7 
Part-time 11.7 
Unemployed  2.8 
Retired  2.2 
Disabled  1.5 
Student 0.6 
Education Background   
Two-year college or Higher Degree 67.1 
Some College Education 21.9 
High School or Lower 10 
Occupation   
Wholesale/retail 11.9 
Information Technology 11.7 
Education 10.2 
Healthcare Service 8.4 
Finance/insurance 8.2 
Business Service/Legal/Accounting 7.6 
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Participants had averaged 20.60 years of computing experience (SD = 7.75). 
3.2 Procedures 
The participants in our study were first presented with a filter question to determine if they used their own 
electronic devices for organizational purposes. A second filter question was then presented to determine if 
they had password management software already installed on their electronic device. Participants who used 
their devices for organizational purposes were deemed organizational users of their own devices and, if 
they did not have a password management software already installed on their respective electronic device, 
they were allowed to participate further in our study, starting with the presentation of either an SDT- or PMT-
embedded appeal. This sample of organizational users are effectively bring your own device (BYOD) 
participants in their respective organizations – a more and more commonly occurring phenomenon in 
businesses (Doargajudhur and Dell 2019)).  
Since we used a full factorial experiment design, one participant was presented with only one scenario. For 
example, if one participant was presented with SDT-embedded appeals, he or she would read one 
combination of statements within SDT-embedded appeals. He or she would not read scenarios with PMT-
embedded appeals. After they read their designated appeal, the participants were then asked to report how 
likely they would be to install password management software on a 10-point scale ranging from “not likely 
at all” to “extremely likely”. Then the participants were assessed for perceptions of threat and coping 
appraisals and motivational variables. Participants directed to the SDT-embedded appeals were assessed 
on questions of SDT-related antecedents, while participants in the PMT group were asked to answer 
questions of PMT-related antecedents. As for the integrated SDT-PMT model, participants who were 
directed into this group were required to answer questions of both SDT- and PMT-related antecedents. For 
this assessment, the measures were assessed using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree.” The SDT- and PMT-embedded appeals and measures were adapted from the Menard 
et al. (2017). Also, similar to Menard et al. (2017), participants were presented with demographic questions 
at the end of the study. The full instrument is presented in Appendix A. 
3.3 Power Analysis and Data Collection 
Based on the estimates provided by Menard et al. (2017), we conducted a F-test: Two-way ANOVA for fixed 
effect, special main effects, and interactions using G*Power. This test is used to calculate the power of the 
main effects in fixed-effects ANOVA with factorial designs. In accordance with the original study we have 
the constructs (factors) of SDT and PMT manipulated at two levels (presence and absence of variable), 
suggesting a factorial design with degrees of freedom equal to one (number of levels (2)-1 =1). Based on 
this calculation, we projected that for a sample of organizational users that were exposed to SDT-embedded 
appeals, we needed a minimum sample of 128 participants. For a sample of organizational users that were 
exposed to PMT-embedded appeals, we required a minimum of 129 participants. Based on some attrition 
in our full factorial experimental design, we collected responses from 897 participants, of which 431 
participants were excluded because they already had password management software installed on their 
electronic devices (laptop/desktop/tablet/smartphone). Our final sample of the analysis for the integrated 
SDT-PMT model consisted of 153 participants. We had a final sample of 313 participants for the comparison 
between the SDT and PMT models. Of these 313 participants, 156 had seen an SDT-embedded appeal, 
and 157 had seen a PMT-embedded appeal. 
4 Data Analysis and Results 
In terms of analyzing the data obtained in our experimental design, we used the same data analysis 
techniques and software as in the original study, structural equation modeling using Smart PLS version 2.0. 
4.1 Measurement Validity 
All the measurements used in the replication study were from Menard et al. (2017). All scale items were 
modeled as reflective indicators of their associated hypothesized constructs. We tested item convergent 
validity and examined cross-loadings for validating the measurements of all models. The results of all 
measurement validity were included and shown in Appendix B. 
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4.2 Hypothesis Testing 
The overall findings and path coefficients are show in Figure 2 and indicate that eight of the 17 hypotheses 
were supported. The supported hypotheses were in solid lines showed in Figure 2. The integrated SDT-
PMT model explained 58.4% of the variance in organizational users’ behavioral intentions to install 
password management software. Further, the SDT variables that affect the PMT model explain 31% of the 
variance in threat severity, 7.8% of the variance in threat susceptibility, 12.2% of the variance in self-efficacy, 
44.9% of the variance in response efficacy, and 4.7% of the variance in response cost. All three SDT 
variables, relatedness, competence, and autonomy, combine to explain 67.6% of the variance in 
organizational users’ motivation to install password management software. Table 3 contains a comparison 
of the Menard et al.’s (2017) original study and our methodological replication of their study based on the 
results of the integrated SDT-PMT model. 
Table 3. Comparison of the Variances Explained in the Integrated Model from the Original Study and from 
the Replication Study 
 Original Study Replication study 
Integrated model→ BI 54.8% 58.4% 
Relatedness→ Threat Severity 41.3% 31% 
Relatedness→ Threat Susceptibility 13.2% 7.8% 
Competence→ Self-Efficacy 6.6% 12.2% 
Autonomy → Response Efficacy 37.6% 44.9% 
Autonomy → Response Cost 12.3% 4.7% 
SDT→ BI 39.9% 67.6% 
In Menard et al.’s (2017) original study, 12 hypotheses were supported, and their integrated SDT-PMT 
model was able to explain 54.8% of the variance in home users’ behavioral intentions to install password 
management software. The integrated model explained 41.3%, 13.2%, 6.6%, 37.6%, and 12.3% of the 
variances in threat severity, threat susceptibility, self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response cost, 
respectively. Therefore, we can see that the integrated model worked slightly better for organizational users 
than home users. The SDT variables were able to explain much more variance in organizational users’ 
motivation (67.6%) to perform the recommended response than in home users (39.9%).  
There are some differences based on the findings of the original study and those of the replication study. In 
the original study, autonomy, relatedness, and competence all have significant impacts on home users’ 
motivation, while only autonomy has a significant positive influence on organizational users’ motivation. It 
seems that in the replication study that relatedness and competence have no significant impact on 
organizational users’ motivation to install the password software. 
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Figure 2. Integrated SDT-PMT Model with Path Significance and Explained Variance 
When we examined the individual relationships in the integrated model, we followed Menard et al.’s (2017) 
inspection and began with the paths related to the integration of SDT and PMT. We analyzed the 
relationships between the motivational antecedents, relatedness, competence, and autonomy, and the 
variables from the traditional PMT model. Presented in Table 4, relatedness had a significant positive effect 
on threat severity (β = .556, p < .001) and threat susceptibility (β = .279, p < .05). Competence also revealed 
a significant positive effect on self-efficacy (β = .350, p < .001). Autonomy posed a significant positive 
influence on response efficacy (β = .67, p < .001) and a significant negative impact on response cost (β = - 
.216, p < .05). These were all consistent with the findings from the original study where it was clear that 
motivational antecedents from SDT further reinforced home users’ perceptions of the PMT variables and 
successfully elicited their intrinsic desire to protect data. In our methodological replication, we are also able 
to confirm that the motivation antecedents reinforce organizational users’ perceptions of all five PMT 
variables and trigger their intrinsic desire to protect data.   
Next, we examined the effect of relatedness, competence, and autonomy on motivation, and the influence 
of motivation on behavioral intention. An organizational user’s motivation to install password management 
software had a significant positive impact on his or her behavioral intention to perform the response (β = 
.369, p < .01). Unlike the original study suggested, however, our findings suggest that only autonomy 
revealed a significant positive influence on organizational users’ motivation to perform the appeal’s 
recommended response (β = .829, p < .001), with relatedness and competence having no significant impact 
on organizational users’ motivation. 
Finally, the direct paths between motivational antecedents and behavioral intention, along with the traditional 
PMT variables and behavioral intention, were analyzed. Among the eight direct paths, only one was 
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significant. Threat severity (β = -.105, p > .05), threat susceptibility (β = .074, p > .05), self-efficacy (β = 
.089, p > .05), response efficacy (β = -.037, p > .05), and response cost (β = -.075, p > .05) all failed to show 
a significant direct influence on organizational users’ behavioral intention to install password management 
software. Although relatedness (β = -.004, p > .05) and competence (β = .026, p > .05) did not significantly 
affect behavioral intention, autonomy had a significant positive effect on organizational users’ behavioral 
intention (β = .376, p < .01). In the original study, there were three significant direct paths stemming from 
the PMT model to home users’ behavioral intention to install password management software: response-
efficacy, competence, and autonomy. Therefore, competence and response-efficacy can be attributed to 
the behavioral intention of home users to install password management software, but not organizational 
users’ intentions. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Path Estimates between Original Study and Replication Study-Integrated Model 
Hypothesis (with direction) Path coefficient (β) t-statistics p-value Supported 
H1: REL → TSEV (+)     
Original Study 0.642 21.298 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.556 5.705 5.890E-08 *** Yes 
H2: REL → TSUS (+)     
Original Study 0.363 9.101 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.279 2.421 0.017 * Yes 
H3: COMP → SEF (+)     
Original Study 0.256 5.397 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.350 4.511 1.284E-05 *** Yes 
H4: AUTO → REF (+)     
Original Study 0.613 19.059 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.67 12.771 7.724E-26 *** Yes 
H5: AUTO → COS (-)     
Original Study -0.351 7.568 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study -0.216 2.074 0.039 * Yes 
H6a: REL → MOT      
Original Study (+) 0.110 3.059 < 0.05 * Yes 
Replication Study (-) -0.056 0.849 0.397 No 
H6b: COMP → MOT (+)     
Original Study 0.083 1.934 < 0.05 * Yes 
Replication Study 0.025 0.278 0.782 No 
H6c: AUTO → MOT (+)     
Original Study 0.565 16.821 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.829 15.067 5.781E-32 *** Yes 
H7a: TSEV → BI      
Original Study (+) 0.048 1.436 > 0.05  No 
Replication Study (-) -0.105 1.187 0.237 No 
H7b: TSUS → BI (+)     
Original Study 0.010 0.308 > 0.05 No 
Replication Study 0.074 0.861 0.391 No 
H7c: REF → BI      
Original Study (+) 0.011 0.305 > 0.05 No 
Replication Study (-) -0.037 0.377 0.707 No 
H7d: SEF → BI (+)     
Original Study 0.088 2.185 < 0.05 * Yes 
Replication Study 0.089 1.081 0.281 No 
H7e: COS → BI (-)     
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Original Study -0.024 0.572 > 0.05 No 
Replication Study -0.075 0.925 0.356 No 
H7f: MOT → BI (+)     
Original Study 0.319 7.334 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.369 3.040 0.003 ** Yes 
H7g: REL → BI      
Original Study (+) 0.013 0.356 > 0.05 No 
Replication Study (-) -0.004 0.048 0.962 No 
H7h: COMP → BI (+)     
Original Study 0.114 3.603 > 0.05 No 
Replication Study 0.026 0.346 0.730 No 
H7i: AUTO → BI (+)     
Original Study 0.344 7.242 < 0.001 *** Yes 
Replication Study 0.379 3.012 0.003 ** Yes 
Notes: * P < 0.05;   ** P < 0.01;   *** P < 0.001 
 
4.3 Analysis of Differences between Self-Determination Theory and Protection 
Motivation Theory Models for Organizational Users 
In order to assess the differences between the two competing models (SDT and PMT), we followed Menard 
et al.’s (2017) lead and used an adapted version of Motulsky and Ransnas (1987) to conduct a series of F-
tests using the models’ residual sum of squares and degrees of freedom. We also included the adjusted R² 
values to show the variances explained in the dependent variables by the independent variables presented 
in the models. Table 5 contains the results of the model and hypothesis comparisons within the replication 
study. 
Table 5. Results of Model and Hypothesis Comparisons for Organizational Users 
  Statistics from Model 1 Statistics from Model 2   
Model 1 and 
Hypothesis 
Model 2 
and 
Hypothesis 
SSR n IVs R²  SSR n IVs R²  F-stat p 
Traditional 
PMT: 
PMT￫ BI 
SDT: 
SDT￫ BI 
1125.042 156 5 .109 544.088 153 3 .518 159.096 <.001 
Modified 
PMT: 
PMT￫ Mot 
SDT: 
SDT￫ Mot 
618.927 156 5 .423 407.664 153 3 .576 77.216 <.001 
Traditional 
PMT:  
PMT￫ BI   
Modified 
PMT:  
PMT+Mot ￫
BI 
1125.042 156 5 .109 804.633 156 6 .359 59.332 <.001 
Modified 
PMT: 
PMT+Mot￫ 
BI 
Modified 
SDT:  
SDT+Mot￫ 
BI 
804.633 156 6 .359 447.582 153 4 .588 118.064 <.001 
The first model comparison involved the traditional PMT and SDT models. The traditional PMT model had 
five independent variables and accounted for 10.9% of the variance in behavioral intention, while the SDT 
model explained 51.8% of its variance. There was a significant difference between the two models (F = 
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159.096; p < .001), and the results indicate that the SDT model is able to explain more variance in 
organizational users’ behavioral intention than the PMT model, with fewer independent variables. 
The second model comparison also involved a comparison between PMT and SDT, but with organizational 
users’ motivation to install password management software as the dependent variable instead of behavioral 
intention. The independent variables of PMT explained 42.3% of the variance in motivation, while those 
from SDT explained 57.6% of its variance. There was a significant difference between these two models (F 
= 77.216; p < .001), suggesting that the SDT model was better in explaining organizational users’ motivation 
to install password management software. 
The third model comparison was between the traditional PMT model and a modified PMT model that 
positions motivation as an additional variable for organizational users’ behavioral intentions to install 
password management software. The findings of this comparison suggest that, by adding motivation, the 
modified PMT model was able to explain a significantly greater amount of variance in organizational users’ 
behavioral intention to install password management software (F = 59.332; p < .001), with the explained 
variance improving from 10.9% to 35.9%.  
The last model comparison was between the modified PMT model and a modified SDT model that also 
included motivation as an additional variable. Although the modified SDT model had fewer independent 
variables, it was able to explain a significantly greater amount of variance in organizational users’ behavioral 
intentions (58.8% as opposed to 35.9%) to install password management software (F = 118.064; p < .001). 
4.4 Analysis of Differences between Self-Determination Theory and Protection 
Motivation Theory Models across Organizational and Home Users 
We also made a similar set of model comparisons, as described in the previous section, to compare the 
models between home users (Menard et al., 2017) and organizational users (methodological replication). 
We followed the same process outlined in the previous section, and the results are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Model Comparisons for Home Users versus Organizational Users 
 
 
Model from Original Study-Home 
Users 
Model from Replication Study-
Organizational Users 
 
 
 
 
Comparison SSR n IVs R²  SSR n IVs R²  F-stat p 
PMT￫ BI  2090.565 449 5 .335 1125.042 156 5 .109 .439 >.05 
SDT￫ BI 1415.027 336 3 .422 544.088 153 3 .518 1.303 <.05 
PMT+Mot￫ BI 1705.293 449 6 .458 804.633 156 6 .359 0.567 >.05 
SDT+Mot￫ BI 1183.636 336 4 .515 447.582 153 4 .588 1.330 <.05 
The first model comparison involved the traditional PMT model and its ability to explain the behavioral 
intentions of home users versus organizational users to install password management software. Based on 
the F-test results (33% for home users versus 10.9% for organizational users), the models did not differ 
significantly, suggesting that despite the possible influences of personal relevance or psychological 
ownership stated in the original study, organizational users reacted to a PMT-embedded fear appeal similar 
to home users.  
The second model comparison involved the SDT model and its ability to explain the behavioral intentions 
of home users versus organizational users to install password management software. The findings of this 
comparison suggest that the SDT model is able to explain significantly more variances (F = 1.303; p < .05) 
in organizational users’ behavioral intentions (51.8%) than home users’ behavioral intentions (42.2%).  
The third model comparison was between the traditional PMT model and a modified PMT model that 
positions motivation as a mediating variable for home users versus organizational users’ behavioral 
intentions to install password management software. Although the modified PMT model is able to explain 
more variance in home users’ behavioral intentions (45.8%) than those of their organizational users’ 
counterparts (35.9%), the F-test indicated that the difference between the two populations was not 
significant.  
Finally, comparisons of a modified SDT model on the behavioral intention of home users versus 
organizational users reveal that an SDT model that includes motivation as a mediating variable is able to 
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explain significantly more variance (F = 1.330; p < .05) in organizational users’ behavioral intentions to install 
password management software (58.8%) than home users’ behavioral intentions (51.5%).  
5 Discussion and Implications 
We conducted the methodological replication of Menard et al. (2017) with organizational users and 
interpreted our results in light of the original study, where the sample population was home users. As we 
interpreted our results and made comparisons with the original study, we found organizational users reacted 
similar to the home users to PMT-embedded fear appeals; however, organizational users are significantly 
more motivated than their home user counterparts (from the original study) to install password management 
software when exposed to SDT-embedded appeals. Although autonomy, competence, and relatedness all 
had significant positive impacts on home users’ behavioral intention to install password management 
software, our findings showed that autonomy is the only antecedent that had a significant positive influence 
on organizational users’ behavioral intention to install password management software. Therefore, an 
emphasis on autonomy in appeals to organizational users should produce the most favorable response from 
them.   
One possible reason for the greater motivation among organizational users to install password management 
software could be their multi-faceted sense of accountability, accountability to themselves, their coworkers, 
and to their organization. Recent research on the topic of deterrence and organizational security has shown 
that organizational users are concerned with the potential embarrassment and loss of respect and goodwill 
among their colleagues if they are found responsible for a breach of security (Johnston et al. 2015). It is 
quite possible that the motivation to install password management software was greater among 
organizational users because of their desire to remain in good standing among their peers.  
In terms of the isolated role of autonomy as the only significant driver of organizational users’ motivation 
and intention to install password management software, a recent study on the collective nature of security 
efficacy suggests that organizational users do not formulate their security beliefs in isolation, but rather as 
part of a collective of peers of similar education, rank, and socio-economic standing in their firm (Johnston 
et al. 2019). In collective environments, the question of autonomy to execute their decisions may be the only 
true question that drives users’ motives and intentions to act. It’s not surprising that relatedness and 
competence were not significant drivers of motivation or intention to install password management software, 
as the data in question are not their own and likely difficult to relate to. Much of the users’ competence with 
the software could be discounted due to the collective efficacy shared within their community of users 
(Johnston et al. 2019).     
Interestingly, compared with the original study of home users by Menard et al. (2017), organizational users’ 
perceptions of competence with password management software and the efficacy of it as a response to 
device and asset protection were not significant direct determinants of their intentions to install the software. 
There are several possible reasons for this outcome, but perhaps the simplest explanation is that 
organizational users have IT support structures and people in place to compel and support their compliance 
behavior when they don’t feel capable (competence) of installing software or don’t believe that the solution 
will work (response efficacy). In either case, organizational users are prone to succumbing to the pressures 
provided by organizational IT officers.  
The findings of our study also suggest that PMT and SDT are both able to effectively model organizational 
users’ intentions to install password management software, but there are some clear differences in how the 
two models were differentiated for organizational users compared to the home users studied in the original 
study by Menard et al. (2017). On its own, PMT clearly struggles to capture organizational user intentions. 
This is the possible result of having organizational IT support structures and personnel in place – a 
demotivator of fear-driven responses – or because of a weakly worded fear appeal lacking sufficient details 
for how the lack of password management software could harm their respective companies. With SDT 
focused on the motivation to enact protective technologies, such as password management software, 
there’s less of a connection with or influence from local IT support structures and personnel. 
Our findings also suggest that SDT works better than PMT in explaining users’ intentions regardless of 
whether they are home or organizational. SDT provides a more parsimonious and more explanatory model 
of their intentions. It is possible that when users are presented with fear appeals, they might think they are 
expected to exhibit certain behaviors and might hesitate to follow a recommended course of action. They 
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may do this simply because performing those actions is not based on their intrinsic motivation to do so. 
Even if they ultimately perform the recommended response, they do so because they are extrinsically 
motivated, not intrinsically motivated. However, if a security appeal contains a component of autonomy, it 
will bolster organizational users’ perceptions of intrinsic motivation and perhaps help them avoid thinking 
that they have been persuaded to act in a certain way.  
All told, the findings of this methodological replication reinforce a boundary condition of an integrated model 
of SDT and PMT for security appeal perceptions that was left unclear in Menard et al. (2017). This replication 
study confirms the initial contention of Menard et al. (2017), that their integrated model of SDT and PMT is 
applicable to both home and organizational users, but also suggests that the results will vary significantly 
depending on the home or organizational user audience to which it is applied. When applied to 
organizational users, we should expect the model to produce dramatically different results, primarily in terms 
of the underlying drivers of motivation and intentions to engage in protective security behaviors. As 
explained in this study, the accountability for organizational users is to many, whereas for home users, they 
are accountable only to themselves. Future research should delve more closely into the nature of 
accountability in this context and how it might complement the integrated model of SDT and PMT as a 
moderating or mediating factor.    
Practically speaking, this research suggests that a clear driver of organizational users’ motivation for and 
intentions to engage in protective security behaviors is perceived autonomy. In the original study where 
autonomy is rarely a question for home users, but in our study of organizational users, there are often 
situations where the autonomy of decisions and actions may be in doubt. The findings of this research 
suggest that appeals for action to organizational users would benefit from a focus on making clear to the 
users their autonomy over their protective security actions. 
6 Limitations 
Although by having organizational users as the target population of our study, we have addressed one of 
the limitations of the original study by Menard et al. (2017), our methodological replication of their work is 
still limited. First, beyond asking participants to self-identify as users of devices for organizational purposes, 
we did not validate our participants as organizational users. As such, it is possible that some participants 
may not be organizational users, but that is a general concern among many studies that employ online 
panel data from sources such as Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
Secondly, we did not include any scales to measure organizational users’ psychological ownership. Menard 
et al. (2017) stated that the psychological ownership organizational users’ perceive for their organizational 
assets could affect how they formulate their strategies for protecting them. If we had captured their 
perceptions of psychological ownership, we could have reported the effect it has on organizational users’ 
intentions to protect their organizational assets. 
Also, Menard et al. (2017) pointed out the complexity of organizational contexts, suggesting that there are 
other possible unknown influences from those contexts that could impact how organizational users response 
to security threats. We did not identify or include any organizational factors in our methodological replication 
beyond those presented by Menard et al. (2017), opting instead to remain true to the tenets of 
methodological replication described by Dennis and Valacich (2014). Future research, however, would 
benefit from a consideration of characteristics of organizational contexts and users, extending the ability of 
the integrated model to explain organizational user protective security motivations and intentions beyond 
what is currently modeled.  
Finally, because the focus of this replication study is on organizational users’ motivations and intentions to 
protect their personal devices used for organizational purposes, it’s difficult to differentiate whether the 
protection motivations and intentions are for organizational or personal purposes. Future research should 
attempt to better isolate these motivations, beyond what is possible in a methodological replication. 
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Appendix A: Instrument Items 
Behavioral Intention to Install Password Manager Software  
Now that you have read the message above, please indicate the likelihood that you will install the password 
manager software described above:  
 Likelihood to install slider scale, 0–10 (0 = Extremely unlikely; 10 = Extremely likely)  
  
Response Performance Motivation (I would choose to install password manager software…)  
 …because I think that this activity is interesting.  
 …because I think that this activity is pleasant.  
 …because I think that this activity is fun.  
 …because I feel good when doing this activity.  
 …because I am doing it for my own good.  
 …because I think that this activity is good for me.  
 …because I decided that this activity is beneficial.  
 …because I believe that this activity is important to me.  
 …because I am supposed to do it.  
 …because it is something that I have to do.  
 …because I don’t have any choice.  
 …because I feel that I have to do it.  
 …but I am not sure if it is worth it.  
 …but I don’t see what the activity brings me.  
 …but I am not sure it is a good thing to pursue it.  
 …but personally I don’t see any good reasons to do this activity.  
Threat Severity  
 If my online passwords were discovered by hackers, it would be severe.  
 If my online passwords were discovered by hackers, it would be serious.  
 If my online passwords were discovered by hackers, it would be significant.  
Threat Susceptibility  
 My online passwords are at risk for becoming compromised.  
 It is likely that my online passwords will be breached.  
 It is possible that my online passwords will be compromised.  
Response Efficacy  
 Password manager software works for protection.  
 Password manager software is effective for protection.  
 When using password manager software, online accounts are more likely to be protected.  
Self-Efficacy  
 Password manager software is easy to use.  
 Password manager software is convenient to use.  
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 I am able to use a password manager without much effort.   
Response Cost  
 Using password manager software is time consuming for me.  
 Using password manager software is burdensome for me.  
 Using password manager software is financially costly for me.  
 Installing password manager software would require too much from me.  
 Installing password manager software is not worth it.  
Autonomy  
 The software described is what I would choose to install on my computer.  
 I feel that the software I’m told to install fits perfectly with what I prefer to use on my computer.  
 I feel that the software described is an expression of my own software preferences.  
 I feel that I have the opportunity to make choices with respect to what I am told to install in the 
message.  
Competence  
 I feel I have a better understanding of password manager software.  
 I feel that I effectively learned about password manager software.  
 I feel that I did a good job learning about password manager software.  
 I feel that I can manage the requirements of learning more about password manager software.  
Relatedness  
 I feel a strong connection with my digital information.  
 If the information contained in my online accounts is affected, then so am I.  
 The thought of information contained in my online accounts being tampered with makes me 
anxious.  
 Protecting the information contained in my online accounts is a way to protect myself.  
  
Computing Experience  
How many total years of general experience do you have working with a computer in any form (e.g., surfing 
the internet, spreadsheets, gaming, word processing)? (Text entry)  
 
Appendix B: Instrument Validity 
All the scales we used in this replication study were from the original study. We tested the convergent validity 
similar to the original study. As in Menard et al. (2017), we assessed convergent validity for all of the 
constructs’ scales using three criteria (Churchill, 1979; Gefen and Straub, 2005; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014): 
(1) all indicator factor loadings should be significant and greater than 0.7, (2) construct composite reliability 
should be greater than 0.8, and (3) average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct should exceed 0.5. 
The results of the replication study indicate that construct reliability ranged from 0.821 to 0.947 and AVE 
ranged from 0.534 to 0.856 for all three models. Therefore, measurement validity was checked and 
established for the replication study. Table B1 depicts the construct validity values only for the integrated 
SDT-PMT model. 
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Table B1. Construct Validity for Integrated SDT-PMT 
Model 
Construct Reliability 
Autonomy .943 
Competence .926 
Relatedness .821 
Response Efficacy .926 
Self-Efficacy .826 
Threat Severity .926 
Threat Susceptibility .855 
We also checked and examined PLS reports for cross-loadings. Convergent validity was significantly 
established for all constructs except for autonomy and competence. Items for AUTO4 and COMP4 were 
removed from the analysis because they failed to load on to their respective constructs. All the remaining 
items in the models had loadings above 0.70 except for two. The first exception was REL1 in the integrated 
model. The item REL1 had a loading of 0.696 that was very close to 0.70, so we decided to keep it in the 
model. The other exception was REL4 in the SDT model. We had to drop REL2 from the SDT model 
because it had a very low loading. Then, the construct of relatedness had only three items: REL1, REL3, 
and REL4. Therefore, we kept REL4 (0.671) as the third item for relatedness.  
 
Table B2. Cross-Loadings, Reliability, and AVE for Latent Variables-Integrated Model 
 
 
AUTO COMP REL REF SEF TSEV TSUS Composite Reliability AVE 
AUTO1 .933 .450 .351 .625 .460 .328 .283 .943 .846 
AUTO2 .919 .400 .357 .614 .408 .343 .278 
AUTO3 .907 .395 .277 .610 .414 .284 .293 
COMP1 .471 .882 .366 .352 .336 .128 .093 .926 .807 
COMP2 .378 .919 .161 .299 .294 .089 .008 
COMP3 .349 .895 .281 .292 .305 .177 -.037 
REL1 .293 .323 .696 .255 .253 .306 .273 .821 .534 
REL2 .158 .148 .719 .253 .079 .465 .088 
REL3 .372 .254 .730 .259 .168 .446 .221 
REL4 .188 .168 .775 .202 .165 .400 .224 
REF1 .555 .305 .266 .880 .401 .292 .250 .926 .807 
REF2 .587 .291 .247 .919 .373 .211 .183 
REF3 .658 .355 .376 .895 .340 .204 .350 
SEF1 .262 .234 .080 .220 .794 .176 .019 .862 .676 
SEF2 .518 .354 .245 .476 .875 .307 .306 
SEF3 .289 .239 .204 .239 .794 .244 .137 
TSEV1 .359 .153 .494 .184 .267 .878 .313 .926 .807 
TSEV2 .291 .124 .510 .260 .268 .911 .190 
TSEV3 .283 .116 .496 .257 .292 .906 .267 
TSUS1 .284 .027 .232 .257 .216 .337 .871 .855 .664 
TSUS2 .315 .096 .177 .288 .184 .148 .754 
TSUS3 .149 -.047 .276 .168 .128 .176 .816 
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An average variance extracted (AVE) of 0.50 or greater was achieved on all constructs. Factor loading 
scores for the analysis of the integrated model are shown in Table B2. The scores for PMT items are shown 
in Table B3, while the scores for SDT items are in Table B4. The reliability of the scales was examined using 
composite reliability scores. The original study used 0.70 or greater as an accepted level. All constructs in 
the replication study obtain scores of at least 0.70 for composite reliability. 
Table B3. Cross-Loadings, Reliability, and AVE for Latent Variables-PMT Model 
 REF SEF TSEV TSUS Composite Reliability AVE 
REF1 .897 .207 .212 .092 .917 .786 
REF2 .887 .259 .128 .160 
REF3 .875 .163 .202 .019 
SEF1 .273 .865 .272 .117 .877 .707 
SEF2 .155 .936 .217 .226 
SEF3 .298 .703 .375 .125 
TSEV1 .234 .353 .956 .307 .947 .856 
TSEV2 .175 .213 .895 .283 
TSEV3 .135 .181 .924 .231 
TSUS1 .204 .210 .364 .840 .840 .637 
TSUS2 .022 .174 .175 .845 
TSUS3 .004 .070 .176 .701 
 
Table B4. Cross-Loadings, Reliability, and AVE for Latent Variables-SDTModel 
 
 
AUTO COMP REL Composite Reliability AVE 
AUTO1 .919 .393 .242 .929 .814 
AUTO2 .911 .397 .219 
AUTO3 .875 .432 .159 
COMP1 .416 .909 .379 .941 .841 
COMP2 .394 .917 .289 
COMP3 .425 .925 .401 
REL1 .251 .308 .790 .814 .595 
REL3 .183 .291 .843 
REL4 .055 .333 .671 
 
Appendix C: Post Hoc Analysis 
Mediation Analysis 
In the original study, the integrated SDT-PMT model indicated several mediated relationships. Therefore, a 
series of medication tests were conducted. We adopted the same process to test mediation effects in the 
replication study, using the Sobel test to determine the significance of the indirect effects in the integrated 
model. Because all five components of the PMT model: threat severity, threat susceptibility, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost, had no significant direct effect on behavioral intention, they could 
not mediate the relationships between any SDT antecedent and behavioral intentions. 
Similarly, relatedness and competence could not mediate behavioral intention though motivation because 
both did not show significant direct effects on behavioral intention. The last antecedent of the SDT model, 
autonomy, demonstrated a significant direct effect on behavioral intention, as well as a significant indirect 
effect on behavioral intention through motivation (p < .01). That was the only mediation effect we found in 
the replication study. The results of the mediation analysis are shown in Table C1. 
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Table C1. Mediation Testing for Indirect Effects 
Relationship 
(IV→ MV →DV) 
ß 
(IV→MV) 
S.E. 
(IV→MV) 
ß 
(MV→ DV) 
S.E. 
(MV→ DV) 
t-Value p-Value Mediation 
REL→ TSEV→ BI .556 .098 -.105 .088 -1.168 .243 None 
REL→ TSUS→ BI .279 .115 .074 .086 1.260 .208 None 
COMP→ SEF→ BI .350 .078 .089 .082 .925 .355 None 
AUTO→ REF →BI .670 .053 -.037 .097 -.381 .703 None 
AUTO→ COS→ BI -.216 .104 -.075 .081 .846 .398 None 
REL→ MOT →BI -.056 .066 .369 .121 -.817 .414 None 
COMP→ MOT→ BI .025 .089 .369 .121 .280 .780 None 
AUTO→ MOT→ BI .829 .055 .369 .121 2.99 .003 Partial 
Partial Least Squares Analysis of Individual Relationships for Model 
Comparison 
The original study analyzed the individual path estimates and evaluated them in each model. The first model 
we assessed in the replication study was the traditional PMT model. Shown in Table C2, it is clear that only 
response efficacy (ß = .341, p < .001) shows a significant direct effect on organizational users’ behavioral 
intention to install password management software. The other components of the traditional PMT model 
had no significant influence on behavioral intention. 
 
Table C2. Path Estimates-Traditional PMT Model 
IV→ DV  
(with direction) 
Path Coefficient (ß) t-Value p-Value Supported? 
TSEV →BI (-) -.062 .534 > .05 No 
TSUS→ BI (+) .084 .752 > .05 No 
REF→ BI (+) .341 3.291 < .01 Yes 
SEF →BI (+) .175 1.165 > .05 No 
COS→ BI (-) -.075 .577 > .05 No 
The second model we evaluated was the modified PMT model. The modified PMT model included both 
traditional PMT components and response performance motivation. In this model, response efficacy (ß = 
.578, p < .001) and self-efficacy (ß = .228, p < .05) had significant impacts on motivation. Motivation also 
demonstrated a significant impact on intention (ß = .673, p < .001). Other direct effects were not found in 
the modified PMT model. The results for path estimates are shown in Table C3. 
Table C3. Path Estimates-PMT Model with Motivation Included 
IV→ DV  
(with direction) 
Path Coefficient (ß) t-Stat p-Value Supported? 
TSEV →MOT (-) -.144 1.599 > .05 No 
TSUS→ MOT (+) .165 1.829 > .05 No 
REF→ MOT (+) .578 6.980 < .001 Yes 
SEF →MOT (+) .228 2.076 < .05 Yes 
COS→ MOT (+) .016 .144 > .05 No 
TSEV →BI (+) .035 .307 > .05 No 
TSUS→ BI (-) -.022 .239 > .05 No 
REF→ BI (-) -.048 .358 > .05 No 
SEF →BI (-) -.008 .070 > .05 No 
COS→ BI (-) -.097 .762 > .05 No 
MOT→ BI (+) .673 7.487 < .001 Yes 
The third model examined was the traditional SDT model on behavioral intention. Organizational users’ 
behavioral intentions to perform the appeal’s recommended response increased as their perceptions of 
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autonomy (ß = .674, p < .001) increased. However, their behavioral intentions did not increase based on 
the changes in competence or relatedness. This finding indicated that autonomy was the only antecedent 
in the traditional SDT model that bolstered organizational users’ behavioral intentions to perform a 
recommended response. However, in the original study, all three antecedents in the traditional SDT model 
had significant impacts on home users’ behavioral intentions to perform the recommended response in the 
fear appeal. Table C4 shows the direct relationships between autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
toward behavioral intention in the replication study. 
Table C4. Path Estimates-Assessing Direct Effects of Self-Determined Appeal on BI 
IV→ DV  
(with direction) 
Path Coefficient (ß) t-Stat p-Value Supported? 
AUTO →BI (+) .674 10.341 < .001 Yes 
COMP→ BI (+) .102 1.311 > .05 No 
REL→ BI (+) .007 .072 > .05 No 
Finally, we analyzed the modified SDT model with motivation included. Autonomy had significant positive 
influences on both motivation (ß = .832, p < .001) and behavioral intention (ß = .291, p < .05). Response 
performance motivation also demonstrated a significant impact on organizational users’ behavioral intention 
(ß = .459, p < .001). The results of the path estimates for the modified SDT model is illustrated in Table C5. 
ACR stands for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. 
 
 
Table C5. Path Estimates-Traditional SDT Model with Direct Effects of ACR on BI Included 
IV→ DV  
(with direction) 
Path Coefficient (ß) t-Stat p-Value Supported? 
AUTO →MOT (+) .832 17.529 < .001 Yes 
COMP→ MOT (+) .044 .598 > .05 No 
REL→ MOT (+) .000 .007 > .05 No 
AUTO →BI (+) .291 2.283 < .05 Yes 
COMP→ BI (+) .122 1.637 > .05 No 
REL→ BI (+) .008 .089 > .05 No 
MOT→BI (+) .459 4.222 < .001 Yes 
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